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Book Reviews

THE COMMERCIAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY. By Nawal K. Taneja. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company. 1977. pp. 340.
It is said that generals are always prepared to fight the last war,
and sometimes the one before that. In the same sense, academia
seems always ready to give us solutions to yesterday's problems.
This is the main difficulty this reviewer had with Dr. Taneja's excellent textbook. As is stated clearly in the preface, "the book is
an attempt to provide the reader with an introduction to the commercial airline industry with emphasis upon managerial practices
and regulatory policies."
If by "the reader," Dr. Taneja means a graduate student working
towards a degree in economics or government, the book is undoubtedly useful. It begins by providing a brief history of the commercial aviation industry both before and after the 1938 introduction of detailed economic regulation of the airlines. In subsequent chapters, the reader is carried through the chain of managerial decisions and regulatory rulings that have shaped the industry
into the multi-billion dollar giant it is today.
Dr. Taneja's background includes service as an economic analyst
with Trans World Airlines. His book reflects his continuing interest
in marketing and financing, but almost entirely on a theoretical
basis. Little, if any, of the application of theory to practice
is revealed to us. Any direct observations Dr. Taneja might have
acquired in his airline work are seemingly reserved to a later
volume. The book also reflects his continuing interest in the application of econometric methods for forecasting the demand for air
transportation, with emphasis again on the theoretical.
While the book suffers from the fact that it was more or less
assembled from lecture notes both of the author and of his colleagues on the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
it does provide a solid background of information on a wide variety
of airline issues of current interest. The net effect, however, seemed
to this reviewer to be a large accumulation of data on a variety
of subjects of interest to Dr. Taneja and the MIT teaching staff,
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while neglecting perhaps an equally wide variety of issues either
entirely or with less than adequate treatment.
The supersonic transport, for example, is given only three pages
at the end of the book. Similarly, the rise of consumerism in commercial aviation, which has had a dramatic impact on airline marketing, as well as upon government regulation (the Civil Aeronautics Board has a large and active "Consumer Advocate" office),
is hardly discussed at all in Dr. Taneja's book. This reviewer also
had trouble with Dr. Taneja's assumption that all his readers had
completed graduate studies in economics. For example, the statement that "the economic behavior of these (U.S. domestic trunkline) carriers is quite different from standard microeconomic theory" is interesting only if the reader is fully acquainted with Dr.
Taneja's version of "standard microeconomic theory." At other
points, Dr. Taneja makes even greater demands on his readers to
supply an MIT-oriented background of understanding. To be fair,
Dr. Taneja does not present his book as something for the masses,
but rather as a textbook that will be useful in the courses that he
and others are teaching. Judged on that basis, there is no denying
the worth of his efforts.
R. Burkhardt*

CAPITAL INVESTMENT CONTROL IN THE AIR TRANSPORT INDUS-

By Robert G. Vambery. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc. 1976. pp. 395.
TRY.

The tendency of transport industries to acquire excessive capacity reached an extreme in the U.S. airline industry in the early

1970's. The wide-bodied aircraft-first the Boeing 747, then the
Lockheed L-10 11 and the Douglas DC-10-were being delivered
to the airlines based on orders placed in the late 1960's which, in
turn, were premised on an assumption of a continuation of the
traffic growth of the 1960's.
* Aviation Editor, Journal of Commerce, Washington, D.C.; author, THE
and THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD; presentTHE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD.
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Delivery of these aircraft (and smaller types ordered on the
same premise) caused a substantial and rather sudden rise in total
capacity which, unfortunately, happened to coincide with a severe
leveling of traffic growth. Having this great capacity on hand, and
pressured by a desire to maintain market shares, airline managements tended to utilize the capacity even to the point where load
factors dropped well below fifty percent system-wide, and in some
markets dropped below forty percent.
In this book, Dr. Vambery, the Director of International and
Transportation Studies at Rutgers University, analyzes this critical
problem of overinvestment in aircraft in the early 1970's and the
steps taken to cope with it such as the capacity agreements which
some airlines, with Civil Aeronautics Board approval, entered into,
largely in the transcontinental and Puerto Rican markets. His concern, though, goes far beyond the temporary crisis and extends into
the reasons why overcapacity appears to be a chronic problem in
common carrier transportation services. He does an impressive job
of showing how complex and multi-faceted the problem really is.
Dr. Vambery defines "excess capacity" broadly to include three
situations: (1) where actual demand is below the forecast on which
management based its earlier aircraft orders, (2) where load factors are at the level that management wishes but are based on
management biases in favor of growth and market share protection
and are thus not at "economically efficient levels," (3) where widebodied aircraft are used with low seating configurations. He notes
that load factors alone may not correctly measure excessive capital investment, because an airline may improve its load factors by
measures such as reducing schedules while retaining the idled aircraft. He attempts, therefore, to measure "excess capital investment
in aircraft capacity" by measuring the gap between the traffic
growth rate forecasted when the aircraft were ordered (with a twoyear to five-year lead time) and the actual growth rate that occurred. By this method, his data show that the aircraft capital
investment of the airlines by the end of 1974 was about forty percent excessive, and this assumes that the airlines were considering
a load factor in the fifty to fifty-two percent range as "normal."
A full chapter is devoted to the capacity-limitation agreements
which began in 1971, including the additional restrictions con-
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nected with the fuel crisis of 1973-74. The conclusion is reached
that the agreements were successful in increasing load factors ana
reducing operating costs without undue harm to the public, but
that their use other than for temporary emergency periods, such as
the airlines faced in the early '70's, is not justifiable. It is argued
that airlines will tend to use capacity freed through agreements on
one route to add to their competition on non-agreement routes,
and that while this may be prohibited by the CAB, it is extremely
difficult to prove in a manner permitting enforcement action in the
judicial context within which the CAB must operate.
Indeed, even where "freed" capacity is not shifted to other
routes, the easing of cost problems on the "agreement" routes allows the carriers to increase their competitive efforts, such as advertising, on other routes. The upshot is that the use of agreements
would tend to spread to all carriers and all routes. This would lead
to managerial complacence, a reduction in incentives to innovate
with respect to schedules, fares, and services, and a situation where
inefficient policies and managerial mistakes would be only lightly
penalized.
At this writing, the capacity agreements have fallen out of favor
with the CAB, Congress, and the Administration, and there are
proposals in some "deregulation" legislation which would prohibit
their use altogether. The message of this book is that they are useful tools in temporary severe situations, but that they should not
continue beyond a year (or at most two years) during which time
the airlines should be on notice that they must adjust their fleets
or their operating practices.
The book makes a variety of recommendations for the control
of excess capacity in the future. Marketing emphasis should be
shifted to expand charter service (especially the one-stop inclusive
tour type) and devices that relate demand to supply closely, such
as seat block sales and the APEX fare where a passenger's ticket is
tied to a specific flight and must be purchased by a specific time
before flight departure. The CAB rate-making load factor standard
of fifty-five percent, derived from the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, should be increased to a sixty to sixty-five percent level.
The use of wide-bodied aircraft should be limited to high density
routes and some of them should be changed to a higher seating
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configuration so as to offer a special low-fare service. Some of these
aircraft, however, should also be kept in the current more spacious
configuration for those passengers preferring comfort to price. Moreover, the airlines should keep smaller aircraft in their fleets for use
everywhere except where traffic density allows the wide bodies to
realize their low seat-mile costs. The smaller aircraft have a cost
advantage on thinner routes and also permit more frequent flights.
It is also recommended that when a heavy oversupply of aircraft exists in the airlines' fleets, "they should work vigorously to
divest themselves of a portion of their fleets." Acknowledging that
losses from sales of aircraft under market conditions of oversupply
may be considerable, the author suggests that such losses may prove
in the long run less than the accumulated losses from operating
with the excess fleet.
On the proposed economic "deregulation" of the airlines, Dr.
Vambery seems dubious that substantial deregulation will help to
control the excess capacity problem. While the book does not concern itself to any great extent with the several deregulation proposals, the author appears to fear that opening up the airways to
unlimited entry would exacerbate the capacity problem, while a
complete deregulation of rates might result in undesirably high
regular fares and some discount fares of unjustifiably low yield. He
also states, however, that a degree of relaxation on the number of
entrants to a market might increase competitive forces and result
in higher load factors.
Dr. Vambery's book covers a wealth of material and involves a
degree of analysis to which a review cannot really do justice. Yet
there are a few points to criticize. The author seems to gloss over
the problems an airline faces when selling part of its expensive
fleet at the very time when other airlines are doing the same thing.
Nor is there any substantial consideration of alternative means of
relieving the excess capacity problem such as leasing aircraft or
seeking ways to shorten the aircraft manufacturers' lead times.
Moreover, the focus is largely on domestic services, although the
capacity problem surely extends very much into the international
sphere.
While the early chapters and the final chapter are written with
commendable precision, certain portions of the book leave the
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reader confused as to when the author is delineating the opinions
and reasoning of the CAB derived from Board orders and when
he is delivering his own opinions.
Nevertheless, these are minor criticisms. The book as a whole is a
valuable contribution, written in a readable style. The author makes
an earnest and knowledgeable effort to go to the heart of the economic problems of the airlines.
William E. O'Connor*

* Ph.D., American University, Washington, D.C.; Associate Professor, EmbryRiddle Aeronautical University; Formerly with the Civil Aeronautics Board.

